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The measure of the ultimate 
Johan Siebers (University of Central Lancashire) 
 
Two contrasting motives are at work in the philosophy of Ernst Bloch. One is the intention 
to dispel illusions and ideologies that chain and oppress humanity – a motive for which 
Bloch returns again and again to the great epochs of enlightenment in the history of thought, 
the other is the intention to show the anticipatory, transcending dimension in consciousness 
and reality, which gives depth, meaning and direction but which is not open to the clear, 
rational analysis that is at our disposal in the critique of ideology. For Bloch, these two 
motivations require and reinforce each other and form two aspects of the same thing: 
philosophical truth. I think it is the double-faced nature of his thinking that is most 
characteristic, and also that which makes his philosophy most significant today. We need the 
penetrating analysis of reason just as much, and in the same movement, as the sensitivity to 
articulate transcendence, without which there can be no truth or at least no philosophy. The 
critique of ideology can only be executed in showing how ideology uses and distorts the 
transcendent orientation in human life, and the articulation of transcendence needs reason to 
keep itself from precisely those distortions and reifications. 
In Das Prinzip Hoffnung Bloch develops an argument which shows that we cannot do 
without a category of a transcendent absolute in philosophy. The basic ontological 
constellation is that of the processual relation between Front, Novum and Ultimum. An 
event, if it is a real event, is at the front of process, it is new and it articulates in a way that 
needs to be understood very precisely, the ultimate. Being as event cannot be understood 
simply as nextness, because nextness is the abstraction of process – it is empty and lacks 
concreteness. The event as something new or unexpected, or the arrival of something or 
someone that is really new, cannot reside in a mere repetition of a new moment, a mere 
‘once more’ or a mere ‘next’ – that type of event decays into the rigid identity of the same, 
the entirely predictable. For the event to be a true event and hence unpredictable, to be new, 
it must incorporate a form of repetition, but in a different way from the abstract 
repetitiveness of the merely next. It requires the changed repetition, in the new event, of the 
as yet unrealised totality of striving, which seeks to be attempted or realised in the 
succession of events. We need the reference to a category of the ultimate, of identity in other 
words, to be able to understand the strong version of the new, which is the unexpected 
arrival of another or of the new. The category of ‘front’ as the mediation between the new 
and the ultimate is meant to capture this moment of the event. Historicity becomes 
dialectical and ceases to be mere succession. The event can only then be completely 
unexpected if it is another step on the way to identity. 
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The importance of this analysis can hardly be overestimated. It shows that identity (as the 
‘last, highest and most thorough repetition’ (5: 233)1) and radical alterity are 
heterogeneously as well as internally related: they require each other and yet are strictly 
irreducible to each other. That paradox can be cited as the most basic expression of the 
fundamental ontology in Bloch’s philosophy. While the alterity of the encounter is, in last 
instance, the closing moment of history (in other words: history exists only as its ending), it 
can only be thought of as such, not as an ultimate in itself: if it was, it would not be a real 
encounter. Thus, in order to rescue the irreducible nature of the event as the unexpected 
arrival of the other (Levinas, Derrida) we have to affirm the totality of identity as well. 
Alterity is the anagnorisis in identity: unverhofftes Wiedersehen, in Hebel’s words. Its 
occurrence is its end: it is the flash, the rupture, of relatedness – it cannot be thought of as a 
state or as static; many recent attempts to develop a philosophy of alterity can be seen, from 
this point of view, to be themselves under the spell of a reification of alterity. This is a good 
example of how we need a strong notion of identity precisely if we are to keep premature 
fixations of identity at bay. 
However, the relation between alterity and identity, between novum and ultimum, is that 
of what Bloch calls ‘extraterritoriality’. We experience extraterritoriality in human life as the 
difference between what is realised in historical process and its core or aim, which has not 
found its way into the expressive process yet. The core of existence is protected against 
death, Bloch writes, because it is not yet alive. If it was, or once it is, and has succeeded it 
will really be extraterritorial to death because death itself belongs to the sphere of the 
inadequate, the less than final (13: 373). One consequence of this is that the anticipations of 
the ultimate, of identity, are not experienced in historical process as such, but in the halting 
of movement, in the symbolic intentions of rare experiences of anticipated rest, arrival, 
holding still (5: 337). 
A mode of philosophising that tries to find out and articulate that in experience and 
reality which points above itself, which is more than what it has yet become, cannot start 
from even as much as the attempt to formulate an unshakeable foundation on which to erect 
a system or a set of valid arguments. The language of this type of thinking is hermeneutical, 
interpretative, tracing – it is discursive and conceptual but seeks the point at which 
connections and relationships emerge or become evident, rather than that it tries to provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions to support certain conclusions. Its starting points, for 
there are several, is neither phenomenological, nor positivist or logicist, although it can be 
critical. Perhaps we can say that Bloch’s philosophy is a speculative critique. The basic 
relation in thought for Bloch is that between the intensive ‘that’ of existence, and the 
categorial ‘what’. The gap between the two is the locus in which reality as process occurs, 
which can therefore be said to be the process of the realisation of categories that are 
                                                           
1 All references to Bloch’s works are to the Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag 1959 
and later. References are between brackets and give the volume, followed by a colon and the page 
numbers referred to. So (5: 233) means Gesamtausgabe, vol. 5, p. 233. 
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adequate to that which is latent in intensive existence. Philosophy itself is one facet of this 
process of realisation – it is one of the trajectories along which humanity realises itself: “Daß 
aber zwischen Daß und Was überhaupt bezogen werden kann: diese Beziehung ist selber 
die Grundkategorie, und alle anderen führen sie nur aus, alle anderen sind nur die 
fortgeführte Lichtung der aus dem Daß entspringenden Was-Vielheit durch ein Wegnetz”. 
(15: 71) The affirmation of the existence of a relation, no matter how broken, tentative, 
promissory, forefelt and dark, between ‘that’ and ‘what’, for which no argument or reason 
can itself be given, amounts to the affirmation of a processual conception of reason for which 
unity and difference are not irreconcilable. It amounts to the idea that reason is not entirely 
alien to brute existence. But that is exactly what has been the hope of philosophy since its 
beginnings, a hope that Hegel reaffirmed over against Kant, and that was subsequently 
placed under attack from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to the postmodern thinkers. It is the 
point where Bloch consciously latches onto classical philosophy, and where Bloch sides with 
Erich Fromm when he writes that ‘reason cannot be effective unless man has hope and 
belief’. The estrangement which reading Bloch today can easily trigger has more to do with 
this basic feature of his philosophy than with Bloch’s allegiance to outdated modes of 
political economics. Moreover, precisely because we have to do here with a dimension of 
philosophy that is hardly open to argumentative deliberation; it seems that Whitehead’s 
remark, that philosophical positions are never refuted but are simply abandoned, is to the 
point here. Bloch’s position has been abandoned broadly since the end of his life. Maybe, 
however, positions can also be taken up again. The practical benefit that a philosophical 
language which is as lyrical as it is reasonable may well have a decisive role to play if this 
were to happen. The philosophical point that pluriformity and otherness require identity, 
not to keep other and same together in an overarching, already given stability, but precisely 
for otherness or pluriformity to be radically other and radically many, may also become 
convincing once more. The currently much discussed view of Alain Badiou, who appears in 
its outward form and statements to constitute a return to philosophy in a more classical 
conception and according to which the many and the one are completely unrelated, issues in 
an arbitrary activism of the one and a removal of the many from philosophy, and of 
philosophy from the process of truth finding. However this may be, it is important here to 
emphasise the fact that a critical and free engagement with Bloch’s philosophy has to 
acknowledge the fundamental assumption of the relation between ‘that’ and ‘what’ if it is 
not to fall back into speechlessness. Curiously, the assumption of the dynamic relation 
between ‘that’ and ‘what’, which is the assumption that there is a meaning in things, leads to 
an attitude that it is far less fetishising about language than much philosophy which cannot 
subscribe to that assumption. Language itself is subjected to the gap like everything else, 
and therefore words have to be taken in their context and as attempting to say something – 
but saying is not stating or picturing or labelling. Language is not primarily a system of 
signs, a verbal magnitude, but a mode of expression – as such it articulates something that 
transcends it, and that is where its nature as a living medium is located. That which 
transcends language cannot be directly put into words, it is there only in language as 
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expressive act – in the act of saying. The philosopher has to speak, has to enact his thoughts 
as a dramatist does. Benjamin writes in his essay on the Wahlverwandtschaften: "Das 
Mysterium ist im Dramatischen dasjenige Moment, in dem dieses aus dem Bereiche der ihm 
eigene Sprache in einen höheren und ihr nicht erreichbaren hineinragt. Es kann daher 
niemals in Worten, sondern einzig und allein in der Darstellung zum Ausdruck kommen, es 
ist das ‚Dramatische’ im strengsten Verstande.”2 Bloch’s style, which is eminently dramatic 
and is a form of lending speech to transcendence as hope – a form of practice, when it is 
successful a form of happiness itself3, can be understood against this background as 
adequate to what it tries to do. In it we learn that happiness, when it is most there, is least of 
all finished and at its end, that contentment or satisfaction and desire do not exclude each 
other but that the more there is of one, the more there can be of the other: satisfaction ceases 
to be the negation of desire; a quality, related to happiness, that we can perhaps refer to with 
words like ‘awe’ or ‘adoration’ arises.4 It is this quality of these texts, which lies like a 
glimmer over them where they are at their best, that provides their measure of truth. 
I believe there can be no philosophy if it is not in one way or another given in by what 
remains inexpressible and which constitutes the heart of existence. It is both that which is 
the utopian surplus in everything that can be expressed and the dark, hidden, face of being; 
in Bloch’s philosophy it resurfaces as the unity of end and beginning. Philosophers are like 
painters or musicians, who paint or play until that inexpressible core becomes visible or 
audible as invisible and mute, and illuminates both the origin and the destiny – the identity 
– of the work. It is what gives philosophical prose its specific quality, that in which it is more 
than science but also more committed to discursiveness than mysticism. Its basis, that which 
makes it possible, appears to be in its minimal form the decision or wager to think as if there 
is a relation to be made between ‘that’ and ‘what’. In a slightly more emphatic sense, that 
decision is made in faith or hope and constitutes faith or hope, or that of faith and hope 
which remains after the acid of critique has done its work, and without which that acid 
cannot do its work.  
What does this mean for Bloch’s philosophical anthropology? In human existence, life is 
given to itself: I have to live my life. The way in which I am given to myself, however, is 
shrouded in darkness. Each moment of my existence is unknown to me in its nearness – 
which means that I am unknown to myself, or I am a question for myself which is so 
fundamental that no possible answer can even be contemplated: the absolute question is an 
inconstructable question, it is what philosophers have called wonder, but a wonder that 
Bloch takes out of its contemplative sphere and takes in an almost existential sense as 
indicating the openness and desire that co-constitute the human condition. As I realise 
myself in subject-object relations, an identity between me and my world is attempted and 
                                                           
2 Walter Benjamin, Illuminationen. Ausgewählte Schriften 1, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1977, p. 135. 
3 Adorno said this about Benjamin’s prose. 
4 There is an echo here of the Aristotelian understanding of happiness as the full-fledged virtuous 
exercise of the potentialities of one’s nature, but it is complemented by a striving and a creativity, an 
‘Überschreiten’ which is not alien to happiness. 
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may succeed from time to time and to a certain extent (for example when I find love, or 
succeed in writing a text or producing something, or in another territorium of human 
realisation), but the ‘darkness of the lived moment’ remains, and with it remains the 
extraterritorial core that is not mediated in the historical process. As long as there is a 
historical process there is the darkness of the lived moment, and no amount of historical 
development or progress can make it enter into history. It is important to understand this in 
its full implications, for otherwise we can easily misread Bloch and think that he held that 
historical development itself will lead to the full realisation of what is ultimate. That is not 
the case – the fact of history itself simply is the darkness of the lived moment, and the hope 
for and premonition of the ultimate motivates history, but does not complete it. History is 
limited by death, but death points towards the extraterritorial that is not part of history. As 
history is motivated by hope, so is our relation to the extraterritorial, but these are two forms 
of hope. Human existence on one hand moves within the sphere of historical hope, without 
which the hope that death is not the final anti-utopia cannot be maintained, but the end of 
history is, as it were, the fulfilment of all of history at the same time, not the final resolution 
at the end of a temporal process. The historical development towards a humane, social 
world is itself one of the real events in history that seeks its fulfilment alongside others, in 
nature and culture. But of that socialist process Bloch said that when its economic goals will 
have been achieved, we will understand how little has been achieved. It cannot be denied 
that Bloch does sometimes speak as if the ultimate is what realises itself in the historical 
process, but if we take it precisely we should always say more than that. Historical reality 
creates its own fulfilment rather than that it moves towards a goal or state that is already 
given. It is dynamic because it carries within itself the premonition of its fulfilment, but its 
fulfilment is not a simple resultant of the historical process itself. Something else is needed, 
to which we can maintain no other relationship than that of hope; it is what is tendentially 
and latently possible in history: “Das höchste Gut ist selber dieses noch nicht gebildete, in 
der Tendenz des Prozesses letzthin bedeutete, in der Latenz des Prozesses letzthin 
realmögliche Ziel.” (5: 1566) There is no other way to it than through history (because it is 
not yet), through the process of externalising the internal and internalising the external, but 
it becomes part of our intentions and orientations in hope, which is precisely the paradoxical 
combination between teleological action and the awareness that not all is in our hands. Hope 
is no guarantee and in that sense ‘process’ as teleological does not have the quality of an 
effectively causal process. The relation between a goal and the process that leads towards it 
is more akin to the relation of manifestation between the will as thing in itself and its 
objectifications in Schopenhauer than to the causal determinism we find in science. The goal 
manifests itself as the new: 
 
Auch in dieser Rückbeziehung auf den Kern und Anfang ist Vorwegnahme das 
Organon jedes überhaupt nur – aussichtsreichen Entsinnens. Wenn überhaupt 
ein Blick hier geraten kann, so ist Vorwegnahme der primäre, der in die Nähe 
des vor-zeitlichen, das ist: des in jedem Augenblick treibend-versteckten, noch 
To appear in: H. Tegtmeyer (ed.). Metaphysik der Hoffnung – Ernst Bloch als Denker des Humanen. 
Leipzig University Press, 2012. 
6 
 
überall außer-zeitlichen, in den Prozeß uneingegangenen Daß-, Wurzel-, 
Grund-Faktors geraten läßt. Sich des Anfangs der Zeiten zu entsinnen: auch 
diese selber uralte und wirklich tiefste Grübelfrage der Erinnerung ist so keine 
der Erinnerung, sondern der Hoffnung. Denn eben das Weswegen ist in allem 
Geschehen das noch unmanifestierte, unidentifizierte Wozu; Alpha kommt, 
statt durch Wiedererinnerung, erst durch Treue zum Ziel als Novum hervor. 
(13: 284; my emphasis) 
 
Vorwegnahme, anticipation, is that which lets us get in the vicinity of that which is not 
part of process (history) itself; the categorial, which Bloch here deliberately describes as 
organon, is the articulation of that Vorwegnahme. In what is truly new, an anticipation of 
the ‘that-factor’ emerges. The ontological relation between history and its fulfilment itself is 
hope, it is itself the fact that there is a relation between ‘that’ and ‘what’. It seems to me that 
this is an exceedingly subtle point, which must be kept clearly in mind if we are not to read 
Bloch as expounding a simple historical progressivism, a transformation to the realm of 
historical development of a theistic creationism – the form of utopian thinking we have 
come to treat with such suspicion. It is easy to say, even if only looking at the passage 
quoted here, that Bloch appears to contradict himself: the ‘that-factor’ is as yet outside of all 
process, and yet it is in process that it emerges as the anticipated new. The ambiguity of this 
statement can then be found back in most statements Bloch makes about the relation 
between historical development and the utopian.5 While it is an open question whether or 
not Bloch sometimes has fallen victim to the flattened view of that relation that this 
ambiguity may trigger, I do think it is at least possible not to fall victim to it, if we emphasise 
the point that Bloch’s philosophical innovation is to assign to ‘hope’ and ontological function 
and meaning, as the name for the relation between existence and essence6: history itself 
becomes eventual, and becomes a hope or anticipation – time, whether seen as temporality 
or as a Newtonian container for events is not the prerequisite for anticipation; rather it is the 
other way around. ‘Future’ has to be understood on the basis of ‘not yet’, not the other way 
around. In this sense, it even becomes possible to understand that time and space for Bloch 
are themselves categories of realisation – in an almost transcendental manner again – 
between ‘that’ and ‘what’, and in their utopian form become what he calls ‘realm’ (Reich) or 
‘home’ (Heimat) and ‘exodus’.7 
                                                           
5 Much of Hans Jonas’ criticism of Bloch is based on this liability to distortion of the Blochian 
ontology. See Das Prinzip Verantwortung, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1979. 
6 Bloch uses this term (or its Germanic cognate Wesen) occasionally, but also suggest the term 
‘subsistence’ to indicate the not-yet. “(E)s fehlt für diese eigentümliche Beschaffenheit sogar der 
entschiedene logisch-ontologische Name. Wird er gesucht, so bietet sich philosophie-geschichtlich 
höchstens der Terminus des Wesenden an (falls er neu, nämlich nicht nur im Grund, sondern aus ihm 
heraus im Ziel gedacht wird)”. (13: 294) 
7 Bloch’s ideas of a ‘riemannian’ elastic time and of ‘future in the past’ fit with this view of time and 
space as, to use a classical term, phenomena bene fundata in re, but not ontologically fundamental or 
irreducible. Again we see a standpoint that is not far off from well-known positions in classical 
metaphysics. Bloch’s philosophy, at all points, speaks directly to the philosophical tradition in a way 
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Again, the relation of manifestation, which is a relation of expression, because of its 
particular ontological nature, has its effect on the mode of writing that sets out to articulate 
it. If that relation is not causal, its articulation in philosophy cannot use the category of 
causality to express it (rather, that category must itself be understood as part of the organon 
of anticipation, so that even in all natural causal relationships we can see an anticipation of 
the ontological not-yet). In a way, Bloch could be said to be thinking the thing-in-itself as 
that which is not yet: this statement may help to bring out that in the ontology of the not-yet 
we are not dealing with the internal constitution of the field of experience but we are at a 
transcendental level – although I do not want to suggest that Bloch was a Kantian or that the 
distinction between noumenon and phenomenon can be transposed to this philosophy 
without qualification.8 The summum bonum is not the ground of process; it is its aim and 
hope – the whole of Bloch’s philosophy moves in this distinction between ground and hope, 
or in other words between ground and sky. Whether in aestheticis, ethics, politics, 
metaphysics or anthropology, the relation between the utopian and the reality it conditions 
is not one of grounding or causing but of wanting – desire. To have established the 
ontological irreducibility of desire, to have shown its intrinsic relation to reason and to have 
freed it from the motive of the ground or origin as presence, which determines for example 
the platonic conception of desire as rooted in anamnesis and, dare we say it, Vorhandenheit, 
constitutes the originality of Bloch’s philosophy and determines his peculiar relation to both 
the history of metaphysics and the critique of metaphysics, with both of which he shares 
partial overlaps, but to neither of which he can be reduced. It also determines his place in 
the history of Marxist-humanist thinking; as faith is the heart of the heart of man, so 
ontological desire (hope) is the heart of the heart of socialist humanism and its principle. The 
problematic reception of Bloch in Marxist philosophy of his time as well as in the ‘bourgeois’ 
philosophy of his time are a result of this orientation, which affirms an ontological structure 
that can easily be mistaken by Marxists for a return to metaphysics and by bourgeois 
thinkers for an exaggeration even of the already wild claims of Marxists about the 
deliverances of revolution. If we take a closer look we see that nothing is further from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
which has not been investigated in any great depth yet; I think it is here that we see the relevance of 
his work most clearly. 
8 We begin to see what could be meant by the qualification ‘speculative critique’ which I introduced 
above. This interpretation may help us to understand how Bloch could link the words ‘principle’ and 
‘hope’: only if we view the relation between principle and the principled as one of manifestation and 
not as one of causal or logical deduction is it clear what it can mean to say that hope can be a 
principle. Justice is the principle of the law in that the law articulates justice in the situations of 
human life, not in that the law is based on an independently available or articulated underlying 
foundation that acts as the principle to which all laws can be reduced. Principle has to be understood 
as ‘archè’: the remaining focus and middle around which the principled revolves. Bloch adds to the 
antique-christian understanding of archè the idea that the true genesis stands at the end, not at the 
beginning. That is what is meant when we say that we do not yet know what justice is, or, for that 
matter, what hope is. Things like justice and hope are the implicit counterparts to the discourses that 
explicate them and which they accompany – we are not far off from Derrida’s notion of hauntology – 
a Spirit of Utopia going around. 
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truth and that we have to do, in fact, with a third way between metaphysics and post-
metaphysical thinking. 
If the utopian kernel in realisation is to be thought of as standing in positive relation to 
realisation – so as playing a role in how realisation turns out – it has to be in some sense a 
measure; desire may not be a cause, but it does put us in touch with a sense of failure or 
accomplishment. The truthfulness of utopia is the measure it provides for concrete action. 
But this cannot be the measure of a pre-given goal against which existing reality can be 
judged. No such goal exists. Bloch returns to the classical motif of the degrees of being and 
to the Hegelian analysis of the measure to trace the nature of measurement that is involved 
here. 
Let us return to the ontological difference between the sphere of the not-yet and that 
which is. In the chapter on the degrees of being in the Tübinger Einleitung in die 
Philosophie (13: 285-296) the contrast between being-not-yet and ‘become being’ 
(Gewordensein) emerges as a qualitative one. Utopian reality “ist nicht nur weniger oder 
mehr Wirklichkeit, im Vergleich mit den anderen Stufen, sie ist eine qualitative andere Art 
Wirklichkeit, durch ihre andere Qualität selber noch von verwandt scheinenden 
Realitätsgraden, wie etwa dem des Ideals, verschieden (...) es ist ein omnia ubique” (13: 293-
4). Even potentiality or possibility is only the most familiar way of indicating that which lies 
like a horizon of the new around what has already become manifest. The traditional 
doctrines of the degrees of being assumed a parallel either between being and value, such 
that more being meant more value, or a parallel between non-being and value, such that the 
less something is, the more its value or worth is. As examples of the first idea Bloch 
mentions Plato, Thomas, Hegel and also Marx; as an example of the second idea we can 
think of Eckhardt and other mystics. Marx acknowledges that substructure, superstructure 
and ideologies can be more ore less real according to circumstances, where ‘real’ means 
mostly ‘efficacious’. Bloch stresses the alien nature of the idea of degrees of being for 
calculative-bourgeois thought and takes over the Marxist view. But in the case of the degree 
of being of the utopian, the qualitative difference of the utopian as compared to all 
quantities of being that have become goes well beyond the Marxist implicit equation of 
reality with efficacy. He appears to be hovering again when it comes to the question how 
this qualitatively different level of being is brought about: “Ja, das Noch-Nicht-Seiende der 
Latenz ist auch als künftiger Seins-Eintritt keineswegs garantiert, dieser Eintritt hängt 
vielmehr von allen Verwirklichungsfaktoren des Prozesses ab” (13: 294). But here we have to 
understand that the coming-about of latency has the character of desire: it strives to become 
real – or reality strives towards it. On page 296 we get a further indication of the nature of 
this bringing-about, when Bloch refers to it as “Hervortritt, Triumph, Sieg” – the gap 
between is and not-yet which opens up in the ontological attitude of hope is, and here I 
come back to the point made earlier regarding the necessity of an orientation on identity, 
intentional and oriented towards finality and arrival. Bloch likes to refer to experiences such 
as ‘knowing something when you see it’ or the dramatic anagnorisis as symbolic intentions 
of the realisation of the utopian. That dimension of teleological finality guarantees that the 
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process of bringing-about is, firstly, open and uncertain, without guarantees, secondly, not 
of an effective-causal nature and thirdly, nevertheless grounded in the historical practice of 
development, revolution and transcending – ‘überschreiten’ – that it is creativity. The 
transition from one state to the next through a dialectical relation between quantity and 
quality – so important for the concept of revolution – appears to be at work here. There are 
quantum limits that trigger qualitative changes, in nature and in society, as well as the other 
way around. We may think of the qualitatively different states of matter, which are triggered 
by quantifiable amounts of kinetic energy.9 But does this mean that we can assign a 
quantitative measure to qualitative transformation, even to the arrival of the utopian? 
Quantifiable extension, which is the basis of the external form of measure, is always a matter 
of more or less, without “ein veränderndes Werden und Umgestalten inhaltlicher Art” (15 : 
152). For example, a simple numerical expression of kinetic energy levels in a material 
substance gives no indication of the differences between the states of matter. Such 
measuring as that which assigns a quantum to a quale to make it comparable across qualia 
remains external and is no measure, or even an adequate description, of the quale itself.  But 
there is another notion of measure – one that is, properly speaking, incommensurably 
different from the external form of measure. This is a form of measure that takes its 
departure from the idea of degrees of being or of intensity and that is inherently dynamic or 
processual: “Es läßt sich ja Statik nur erledigen durch ein neues Messen, das nicht an einem 
vorgegebenen Maßtab, sondern an einem werthaften Maß mißt.” (15: 154; my emphasis) The 
difference between the two metrical operations is that the first uses an existing benchmark 
as a standard against which to compare, whereas the second, the value-based measurement, 
does not require a present standard of comparison, but an expression of levels of intensity 
(of whatever the thing that is to be measured consists). In the sphere of physical 
measurement we can think of the difference between, for example, measuring height and 
measuring loudness or saturation. An intensive measure is a measure by degree, it can never 
be an exact, quantified measure, but it is a measure nonetheless. Such a measure is specific 
to what it measures, it cannot be transposed to other areas, but is internal to its object, it is 
“lebendig-elastisch” (15: 152):  
 
Solch parteiisches Messen scheut sich nicht davor, ein gegebenes Maß gerade 
als unwahr zu denunzieren, also sich vor allem historisch-dialektisch nach 
derjenigen Wahrheit zu richten, die sogar schon gemeint ist, wenn von einem 
wahren Freund die Rede ist oder auch von einem falschen Glanz, und sei er 
noch so faktisch. (15: 154) 
The idea of a measure that is given with ontological truth (‘a true friend’) is certainly 
central to understanding how the utopian can be a measure and can therefore be used in the 
                                                           
9 I do not think Bloch anywhere discusses in detail the states of society, the personal dyad, the group, 
the class, the mob, the mass – but I think it would be in line with his thinking to develop such a 
categorisation, as others have done. 
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historical process of realisation, but it is not enough. We have already seen the centrality of 
transgression for an understanding of the not-yet, and its precisely this aspect of 
transgression or exodus that is not easily accounted for in the traditional theory of measure, 
which is based in idealism and in a static ontology. Bloch notes this problem with the 
classical conception of measure, at least as it has been handed down to us in Greek and 
medieval philosophy. For those modes of thought, the measure is essentially limited: 
Und dennoch ist hier zu warnen, auch das qualitative Maßdenken hat von lang 
her seine Eierschalen. Griechisch etwa trat das qualitative Wertmaß auf als die 
mèsotès, ihr Maßhalten und Sichbescheiden richtet sich gegen alles 
Grenzüberschreiten. Die Warnung vor dem Übermaß kam schon antikisch 
herab bis zu der fast spießigen Mahnung des mèden agan, des Nichts allzusehr, 
also von allem ein wenig, mit fragwürdiger Besonnenheit des Verzichts. (15: 
153) 
It is as if an ontology of measure does not allow us to experience borderline or limit 
situations, in which the ontological fullness manifests itself. And yet it is precisely in these 
borderline situations that we witness the that becoming what – daß becoming was: recall that 
it was only in the front that ultimate identity is manifested as the truly new. The category of 
front is the ontological generalisation of the limit situation: the ontological ground structure 
of realisation requires the Grenzsituation – Bloch’s word for it is konkrete Utopie. By 
interpreting the fullness of a value as its exodus form, its concrete not-yet, Bloch is able to 
rescue the metaphysics of the degrees of being, without having to also accept its sense of 
fixed order and static hierarchy, or – in its Hegelian form – its latent view of knowledge as 
anamnesis, as remembering what is already there, which makes the dialectical process of 
history into a necessary linkage of unfolding stages in which one leads to the next. For 
Bloch, on the contrary, at every point, intensity breaks out into the open, the new, the not yet 
– the world at its front is the ontologically highest point, this front is a limit, and we, who are 
at the front, are ourselves the crossing-over into the new – Denken heisst Ueberschreiten. This 
sentence now acquires a deep significance, Bloch’s version of the identity of thinking and 
being which does not exist and is not present as an essence, but which nevertheless can be 
said to subsist. It is the point where he can link to Marx’s statement that the goal of history is 
the naturalisation of man and the humanisation of nature, in which both will be changed to 
what they in truth are. This is the process in which existence becomes essence, the becoming 
of Heimat as an intensive, not an extensive, category and it is precisely this movement and 
realisation of moments that is commoditised in capitalism. In socialist practice, the measure 
of the ultimate becomes the soul of a concrete utopian practice and the measure of its 
critique of alienation, even if that socialist practice itself is by no means the reality of the 
ultimate yet. In this way, I think Bloch has tried to colonise the metaphysical empire and 
make it inhabitable for a concrete, historical and political humanist practice. Both that 
practice and the metaphysical theory need each other, at least in Bloch’s synthesis, and help 
each other to their truth. In doing this, Bloch has succeeded in addressing and actively 
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inheriting most, if not all, of the problems and dimensions of existence classical metaphysics 
dealt with, while also addressing the purport and relevance of the critique of metaphysics, 
from Kant, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to Heidegger, and, of course, to Marx and Engels 
themselves.10  
The 1918 edition of Geist der Utopie ends with a few lines that already, at the beginning 
of Bloch’s development as a philosopher, express the central motives that I have tried to 
draw attention to here: 
 
Denn wir sind mächtig; nur die Bösen bestehen durch ihren Gott, aber die 
Gerechten – da besteht Gott durch sie, und in ihre Hände ist die Heiligung des 
Names, ist Gottes Ernennung selber gegeben, der in uns rührt und treibt, 
geahntes Tor, dunkelste Frage, überschwengliches Innen, der kein Faktum ist, 
sondern ein Problem, in die Hände unserer gottbeschwörenden Philosophie 
und der Wahrheit als Gebet. (16: 445) 
 
In this admittedly very expressionist, if not pathetic, language11, we nevertheless see the 
reification of the utopian in the God of the ‘wicked’ and the resolution of the conception of 
God as the transcendent highest being into the dark inner striving, at the heart of process 
but yet external to it, and therefore giving rise to the process of realisation, which can 
therefore be called with an appropriate metaphor the ‘naming of God’. The form of truth 
that provides the measure for this deepest existential dimension of the process of realisation, 
of human life, is truth as hopeful, intentioned anticipation – what we mean or meant by 
‘prayer’. That ontologically fundamental hope is not a guarantee, its anticipation not a 
passive, rosy expectation, rather it is a hope in the face of hopelessness, a creative attitude in 
the absence of a ground for hope. But that, we can see now, only helps further to release 
hope into its own utopia and arrival.12  
Are these conceptual connections and these interpretations of the human condition still 
relevant for us? Can we use the intensive measure of the unity of critique and utopian 
consciousness to look again at our own attitudes, practices and presuppositions in (cultural) 
politics, environmental ethics, philosophical anthropology and indeed metaphysics? Can we 
                                                           
10 See my “Myth means: the saying word / The Lord said that he would dwell in thick darkness”, in: 
L. Hemming, B. Costea, K. Amiridis (eds.), The Movement of Nihilism: Heidegger’s Thinking after 
Nietzsche, London: Continuum 2010 (to appear) for a discussion of Heidegger’s critique of 
metaphysics from the point of view of Bloch’s ontology. 
11 Note that pathos is actually a prerequisite for ontological understanding. We know hope as an 
affect, and from there we can understand it as an ontological magnitude. Bloch reasons in a similar 
fashion to Schopenhauer in his use of the word ‘will’. 
12 With these considerations in mind, it is not difficult to see why M. Riedel classifies Bloch’s 
philosophy as a largely Nietzschean artists’ metaphysics (see Tradition und Utopie: Ernst Blochs 
Philosophie im Licht unserer geschichtlichen Denkerfahrung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1994, pp. 268-
288). I cannot agree with this because Bloch understands art on the basis of the utopian ontology, not 
the other way around. But a full discussion of Riedel’s suggestion is necessary. I must, however, leave 
that for a future occasion here. 
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approach Bloch at all without allowing him to approach us as well? What are the terms on 
which a contemporary dialogue with Bloch could become possible again, and why would 
that be desirable? These questions cannot be discussed here; what I have tried to do is to 
show the subtlety and consistency of his philosophy, which certainly had a role to play in 
capturing its own time in thought and to suggest that perhaps his time has not yet ended 
because at the deepest level it has not yet begun. All writing is utopian. 
 
 
 
